Money and capital as competing media of exchange in a news economy by David Andolfatto & Fernando M. Martin
      Research Division 
          Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 





Money and Capital as Competing Media of Exchange 






















FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS 
Research Division 
P.O. Box 442  
St. Louis, MO 63166 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate 
discussion and critical comment. References in publications to Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working 
Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should be 
cleared with the author or authors. Money and Capital as Competing Media of
Exchange in a News Economy∗
David Andolfatto† Fernando M. Martin‡
September 11, 2009
Abstract
Conventional theory suggests that ﬁat money will have value in capital-
poor economies. We demonstrate that ﬁat money may also have value in
capital-rich economies, if the price of capital is excessively volatile. Excess
asset-price volatility is generated by news; information that has no social
value, but is privately useful in forming forecasts over the short-run return
to capital. One advantage of ﬁat money is that its expected return is not
linked directly to news concerning the prospects of an underlying asset.
When money and capital compete as media of exchange, excess volatility
in the short-term returns of liquid asset portfolios is mitigated and welfare
is improved. A legal restriction that prohibits the use of capital as a
payment instrument renders the expected return to money perfectly stable
and, as a consequence, may generate an additional welfare beneﬁt. JEL
codes: E4, E5. Keywords: Money, Capital, News, Excess Volatility.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
When record-keeping and commitment is limited, realizing the gains to intertem-
poral trade requires a settlement object. In an economy with physical capital,
the settlement object may take the form of capital; or, equivalently, ﬁnancial
instruments representing claims against capital. A long-standing question in
the theory of money and banking is whether the supply of such settlement ob-
jects should remain in the exclusive domain of the private sector; or whether a
government intervention is warranted.
∗Andolfatto acknowledges the ﬁnancial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada and the Bank of Canada Research Fellowship Program. The
views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors.
†Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, P.O. Box 442, St. Louis, MO,
U.S.A., 63166.
‡Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, B.C.,
Canada V5A 1S6.
1In a large body of the literature devoted to this question, the answer appears
to hinge on the productivity of an economy’s storage technology. That is, if the
storage technology is poor, eﬃciency dictates the accumulation of a low stock of
capital. But if capital also serves as a medium of exchange, this low stock may
not be suﬃcient to serve an economy’s liquidity needs. The equilibrium response
is an overaccumulation of capital; see, for example, Lagos and Rocheteau [6]
and the references cited within.1 This result continues to hold if capital is
replaced by ﬁnancial claims to capital, or ﬁnancial claims against other objects
(e.g. labor) collateralized by capital; see Ferraris and Watanabe [4]. When
this is so, the introduction of a ﬁat money instrument improves social welfare.
Money is a good substitute for poor-return capital as a payment instrument; its
introduction expands liquidity and economizes on capital.
In this paper, we explore another possible source of societal value for ﬁat
money; namely, its relative insensitivity to ﬂows of information that cause the
price of capital to ﬂuctuate excessively. To formalize this idea, we develop a
version of the Lagos and Rocheteau [6] model where the return to capital is
subject to aggregate risk. Optimal capital investment is determined solely by
long-run expected return. Between the time an investment is made and the time
it matures, new information alters the expected short-run return to capital. By
construction, “news” confers no social beneﬁt. Nevertheless, news has private
value; and as such, it is rapidly incorporated into asset prices. In this way, the
interim price of capital exhibits excess volatility; a property that hinders its use
as a payment instrument. In particular, a “bad news” event depresses the price
of capital in the short-run, leaving some individuals with insuﬃcient purchasing
power (they are debt-constrained).
One advantage of ﬁat money is that its expected return at any frequency
is not linked directly to news concerning the prospects of an underlying asset.
When money and capital compete as media of exchange, excess volatility in the
short-term return of a liquid asset portfolio is thereby mitigated and welfare is
increased. Our result is subtle in that it does not rely on money having less
risk than capital. Indeed, the result continues to hold if money is risky, or even
riskier than capital; when return is measured over longer horizons. The key
property is that the expected return to money is less sensitive to news.
The monetary equilibrium of our model economy has the following proper-
ties. First, although money is welfare-improving, there is still an overaccumula-
tion of capital (except at the Friedman rule). Second, there is a Tobin eﬀect; in
the sense that higher inﬂation stimulates capital expenditure. Third, although
money and capital are equally liquid, capital dominates money in (long-run)
expected return. Fourth, the imposition of a “cash-in-advance” constraint has
ambiguous welfare consequences; but is generally welfare-improving at low in-
ﬂation rates.
The ﬁrst two of these properties are also found in Lagos and Rocheteau
1If the capital stock is ﬁxed, then the result is an overvaluation of the asset.
2[6]; but the second two are not. In particular, their (liquid) capital earns the
same rate of return as money and the imposition of a “cash-in-advance” con-
straint there is strictly welfare-improving. We elaborate on these results below,
following the formal exposition of the model.
2 The Environment
There is a [01] continuum of inﬁnitely-lived individuals. Time is discrete and
the horizon is inﬁnite. Each time-period is divided into two subperiods labeled
day and night. Output is produced and consumed in the day and in the night;
label this day-output and night-output, respectively. Economic activity in the
day and night is centralized (there are no search frictions).
Let () ∈ R denote consumption (viz production, if negative) of day-output
by individual  at date  Let {() ()} ∈ R2
+ denote consumption and pro-
duction, respectively, of night-output by individual  at date  Individuals have





 [()+0 5(()) − 05(())] (1)
where 00  0  0 0(0) = ∞ 0  0 00 ≥ 0 and 0 1 The interpretation
here is that each individual is subject to an i.i.d. shock, realized at the beginning
of each night, that determines their type for the night. We assume that there
are only two types: consumer and producer; and that the population is divided
evenly among each type. A consumer wishes to consume and has no ability
to produce; while a producer has no desire to consume and has an ability to
produce. Assume that night-output is nonstorable.
Let  denote the aggregate capital stock at date ; with 0 ≥ 0 given. This
capital produces () units of day-output; where 0    ∞ denotes a
productivity parameter and 00  0  0 0(0) = ∞ 0() = () for some
0 1 Implicit in this formulation is the existence of a ﬁx e df a c t o r ;w h i c hw e
interpret as a human capital input, distributed equally among the population.
Capital depreciates fully after use in production; the future capital stock
+1 is generated entirely by the day-output stored from one day to the next.
Capital is not valued as consumption during the night; nor can it be used to









Productivity evolves randomly over time. This stochastic process is i.i.d.
3from one day to the next, so that +1 =  for all  There is another stochastic
process that generates information  (news)a tt h eb e g i n n i n go fe a c hn i g h t .
Assume that news can be either bad or good;s ot h a t ∈ {} Let  ≡
Pr[ = ] and 0 1 News received at night in period  may be useful for
the purpose of forecasting productivity the next day. That is, let (+ | ) ≡
Pr[+1 ≤ + |  = ] and assume that (+ | ) ≤ (+ | ) Deﬁne () ≡ R
(+|) Clearly 0  () ≤  ≤ ()  ∞ where  ≡ ()+( 1− )()
Consider a planner that maximizes a population-weighted sum of (1) subject
to (2) and (3); and label the solution to this problem the ﬁrst-best allocation.I t
should be clear enough that this solution will entail +1 = ∗ for all ; where
0(∗)=1 (4)
Moreover, given the properties of  and  together with a population that
is equally divided at night between consumers and producers, it follows that
()=()=∗ for all (); where
0(∗)=0(∗) (5)
Given (∗∗) the allocation {∗
()} is determined residually by the resource
constraint (2).2
Lemma 1 The ﬁrst-best allocation is independent of news.
The result in Lemma 1 is, of course, an artifact of the manner in which
“news” is modeled here. In particular, information useful for forecasting arrives
“too late” to impinge on capital investment decisions.
3 Competitive Equilibrium
We begin by examining the competitive equilibrium of this economy absent any
government policy. In what follows, we assume that individuals are anonymous;
so that private debt cannot exist. As in Lagos and Rocheteau [6], assume that
capital can be used as a means of payment in the night-market.3
3.1 Decision-Making
Competitive factor markets imply the standard equilibrium pricing functions
for capital and the ﬁxed factor (human capital) in the day; i.e.,
()=0() (6)
()=() − 0() (7)
2Because individuals have preferences that are linear in day-output, they are indiﬀerent
between any lottery over {()} that generates the expected value 0() − +1
3Alternatively, one could follow Ferraris and Watanabe [4] and assume that individuals
(perhaps through an intermediary) can issue debt that is securitized by physical capital.
4Anticipating that  will remain constant in equilibrium, we suppress the depen-
dence of  in these pricing functions to ease notation.
At the beginning of the day, an individual will have been either a consumer
or producer the previous night; index this history by  ∈ {} An individual
who enters the day with capital  generates income () +() Let 
+
 ≥ 0
denote an individual’s capital investment during the day (matures as productive
capital the next day). The budget constraint during the day is given by
 = () + () − 
+
 (8)
A recursive representation of the choice problems follows. The choice prob-














 ) represents the value of entering the night with future capital

+




Here we have the familiar result (Lagos and Wright [7]) that 
+
 = + is iden-
tical across all individuals, regardless of their trading history. By the envelope
theorem
1()=0() (10)
At the beginning of the night, individual types become known and news is
revealed. Let () denote the price of capital measured in units of night-output.
Consumers are subject to the debt-constraint ()+ ≥  or +
 ≡ +−() ≥




















()0 (()) = ()0(+)+() (11)
B yt h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e m
1(+)=()0 (()) (12)

















()0(()) = ()0() (13)
5B yt h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e m
1(+)=()0 (()) (14)
Now form the expression  ≡ 05 +0 5 Using the envelope results (12)
and (14), we have
1(+) ≡ 05()[0 (()) + 0 (())]+(1−)()05[0 (()) + 0 (())]
This latter expression, together with (9) implies
2=()[0 (()) + 0 (())] + (1 − )()[0 (()) + 0 (())] (15)
3.2 Market Clearing
The following restrictions must hold





Apart from the initial date, the capital stock will remain constant over time so









Note that () is strictly decreasing in  and that (∗)=1  Next, invoke the
market-clearing condition ()=() and express (15) as
1=()0 (())(()) + (1 − )()0 (())(()) (17)



















Moreover, the debt-constraints imply () ≥ (); or by use of (18)
()0() ≥ 0(())() (20)
63.3.1 Equilibrium in a No-News Economy
In a no news economy, ()=; so that ()= and (()) = () Assume
that the debt constraint does not bind (a conjecture that needs to be veriﬁed).
It follows that  = ∗; in which case  =1  In this case, the restriction (19)
reduces to 1=0(); so that  = ∗ If the debt constraint is to remain (at
least weakly) slack, then condition (20) implies
∗ ≥ 0(∗)∗ (21)
Whether condition (21) holds or not depends on parameters. It is common
in overlapping generations models with capital to assume that the analog to
(21) does not hold. Lagos and Rocheteau [6], whose environment is essentially
identical to our own absent news, also assume that (21) does not hold; see also




where clearly, 0  ∗ and 0  ∗ This is just the standard “over-accumulation
of capital” result that motivates the introduction of a ﬁat money instrument in
much of the literature.
For the remainder of the paper, we assume that condition (21) holds as an
equality; i.e.,
[A1] ∗ = 0(∗)∗
We impose [A1] primarily for the purpose of exposition; the main results
may continue to hold more generally. When [A1] does hold, it follows that
the competitive equilibrium implements the ﬁrst-best allocation in a no-news
economy.
3.3.2 Equilibrium in a News Economy
In a news economy, ()  ()
Lemma 2 In a news economy, it cannot be the case that ()=0for  ∈ {}
(consumer debt constraints cannot remain slack in both news states).
Proof. If ()=0  then (11) and (13) imply that ()=∗ In this case,  =1
and so, by condition (19),  = ∗ Moreover, since ()=∗ condition (20)
implies that ()0(∗)∗ ≥ 0(∗)∗ which by [A1] simpliﬁes to () ≥ ; a
contradiction.
7Lemma 3 In a news economy, it cannot be the case that ()  0 for  ∈ {}
(consumer debt constraints cannot bind tightly in both news states).
Proof. If ()  0 then (20) implies
()0() = 0(())()
()0() = 0(())()
These two conditions, together with ()  0 imply that ()  ()  ∗
In turn, this implies that (())  (())  1; so that, by condition (19),
 ∗ Observe that the two equalities above imply
0() = 0(())()+( 1− )0(())()
As  ∗ it follows from [A1] and the assumed properties of  that 0()
0(∗)∗ = 0(∗)∗ Therefore,
0(())()+( 1− )0(())()  0(∗)∗
But this is a contradiction; as ()  ()  ∗
Lemmas 2 and 3 imply that, given [A1], the debt-constraint will bind tightly
in one news state and remain slack in the other. It is easy to verify that the
constraint will bind in the bad news state. Label this equilibrium allocation
{1() 1}
Proposition 1 In a news economy, the equilibrium allocation satisﬁes 0 
1()  1()=∗ and 1  ∗
Proof. As ()=0  it follows that 1()=∗ so that (1()) = 1 As
()  0 it follows that 1()  ∗ so that (1())  1 By conditions (19)











As (1())  1 it follows from the ﬁrst of these conditions that 1  ∗
If the analog to condition [A1] holds in the Lagos and Rocheteau [6] economy,
there is no over-accumulation of capital. When [A1] holds in the news-economy,
however, there is an over-accumulation of capital. This over-accumulation is
directly related to the stochastic news shock; which leads to a binding debt-
constraint in bad-news events only. So, even the chance of being debt-constrained
generates the same incentive to over-accumulate capital.
Consistent with the eﬃcient-market hypothesis, equilibrium asset-prices ()
rapidly adjust to any new and relevant information; in particular,
8Lemma 4 In a news economy, the equilibrium price of capital at night satisﬁes
()  ()
Proof. In equilibrium, the debt-constraints imply () ≥ (). Given Propo-








One consequence of this “informationally eﬃcient” market structure is that
it leads to an allocative ineﬃciency; see also Andolfatto [1]. A bad-news event
here leads individuals to (rationally) revise downward their forecast of the future
return to capital. In turn, this leads to a decline in the asset price, leaving
consumers with insuﬃcient purchasing power to acquire the ﬁrst-best level of
night-output.
Proposition 2 In a news economy satisfying [A1], a nondisclosure policy (sup-
pressing the news ﬂo w )i sw e l f a r e - i m p r o v i n g( t h eﬁrst-best allocation is imple-
mentable).
If the nondisclosure of news is infeasible, then condition [A1] guarantees that
the competitive equilibrium allocation described above is ineﬃcient. This then
opens the door to policy interventions that may improve welfare. Naturally,
if we endow the government with enough coercive power and tax instruments,
the policy-design problem becomes trivial. In what follows, we assume that the
government can impose no penalties on individuals. While admittedly extreme,
this allows us to focus on Pareto-improving policies that do not rely on any form
of coercion. These considerations lead us to examine the role of government
debt.
4 A Monetary Economy
The government can issue durable, divisible, and non-counterfeitable tokens
that will henceforth be labeled money.L e t denote the aggregate supply of
money and let  ≡  − − denote new money creation. Assume that the
money supply grows at a constant rate  = −; so that  =[ 1− 1]
New money is injected as a lump-sum transfer at the beginning of each day. As
lump-sum taxation is prohibited, we have  ≥ 1
Let 1 and 2 denote the price of money measured in units of output in the
day and night, respectively. Individuals enter the day with ﬁat money ; or
in real terms  ≡ 1 They leave the day with money ; or in real terms
 ≡ 1 Let  ≡ 1
94.1 Decision-Making
In the day, the choice-problem is described by
( ) ≡ max
+
©
() + ()+ − + −  +  + (+)
ª
Desired money and capital holdings are characterized by
1=1(+) (22)
1=2(+) (23)
B yt h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e m
1( )=0() (24)
2( )=1 (25)
































The desired future asset position is characterized by







































The desired future asset position is characterized by










As in an earlier section above, form the expression  ≡ 05 +0 5 and
gather restrictions to derive
2=()[0(()) + 0(())] + (1 − )()[0(()) + 0(())] (34)
21 = 2()[0(()) + 0(())] + (1 − )2()[0(()) + 0(())](35)
Note that (34) is identical to (15) derived earlier.
4.2 Market Clearing








The market-clearing conditions are given by














In a stationary equilibrium,  = + and  = + It follows that 1
+
1 = 


















[(()) + (1 − )(())] (39)






Note that condition (38) is identical to condition (19). If a monetary equilibrium





[(()) + (1 − )(())]
The remaining two conditions (38) and (40) are in this latter case equivalent to
(19) and (20).
Proposition 3 In a no-news economy, there does not exist a monetary equi-
librium with  ≥ 1.
Proof. Consider a no-news economy, i.e., ()= and suppose a monetary
equilibrium exists, i.e., 0. Note that no news coupled with  ≥ 1 imply
()=()= ∗. Thus, conditions (38) and (39) become 1=0()
and 1=

(), respectively. This implies  ∗ and strictly increasing in ;
and  ∗ and strictly decreasing in . Condition (40) is held with equality
and implies  =

[0() − 0()]. Mechanically, notice that if  = ,t h e n
 = ∗,  = ∗ and thus, by [A1]  =0 .S i n c e is strictly increasing in  and 
is strictly decreasing in , it follows that 0 for any  ≥ 1, a contradiction.
The intuition for the result above is that in a no news economy, capital as the
only means of payment achieves the ﬁrst-best. Thus, there are no individual
gains from acquiring an asset dominated in rate of return, which means ﬁat
money is not valued.
We now analyze the monetary equilibrium in a news economy.
Lemma 5 In a news economy with money and  ≥ 1, consumer debt-constraints
cannot remain slack in both news states.
Proof. Slackness in both states implies ()=∗; so that (()) = 1 By
(39), this can only be possible when  = ; which violates  ≥ 1
Lemma 6 In a news economy with money, consumer debt-constraints cannot
bind tightly in both news states.













Hence, ()  ()  ∗ and (())  (())  1 It then follows from (38)
that  ∗ Utilizing these latter two expressions, one may derive






By [A1] and the properties of , 0()   0(∗)∗ = 0(∗)∗ As  ≥ 0
this implies
0(())()+( 1− )0(())()  0(∗)∗
which contradicts the condition ()  ()  ∗
Lemmas 5 and 6 imply that the debt-constraint will bind tightly in one news
state and remain slack in the other. It is easy to verify that the constraint will
bind in the bad news state. Label this equilibrium allocation {2() 2 2}
Since the debt-constraint binds in the bad-news state and remains slack in the
good-news state, ()  ()=∗ This, in turn, implies that (())  1 and
(()) = 1 These conditions, together with (38), (39) and (40), imply that
the competitive equilibrium allocation {2() 2 2} is characterized by













We need to establish the conditions under which ﬁat money coexists with
capital. To this end, note that condition (42) determines 2() as a function
of  Observe that 2() is strictly decreasing in  Condition (41) determines
2  ∗,g i v e n . Moreover, note that 2 is strictly increasing in 







[0(2())2() − ()0(2)2] (44)
Fiat money coexists with capital if and only if 2  0
Assume momentarily that lump-sum taxation is feasible (so that any 
is possible). As  & , conditions (41) and (42) imply 2 & ∗ and 2() % ∗,
respectively; using [A1], condition (44) implies 2 % ∗[1 − ()].I ns h o r t ,i f
13the Friedman rule is feasible, then our economy with outside money implements
the ﬁrst-best allocation and 2  0 Now, given that 0() is increasing in ,
and that 2() is decreasing while 2 increasing in  it follows from (44) that
2 is decreasing in 
So, we have to this point established that 2  0 in the neighborhood of the
Friedman rule and that 2 declines monotonically in  Evidently, there exists a
large enough  say  ≤∞that will guarantee 2 =0  The value  depends
on parameters; for example,  % ∞ as () & 0 and ¯  &  as () % ().
In general,  ≷ 1 When lump-sum taxation is infeasible, as we have assumed
here, 1 implies that ﬁat money cannot coexist with capital. In what follows
then, we assume a parameterization such that the following is true.
[A2] The minimum (gross) inﬂation rate that generates a zero demand for real
money balances, , is greater than unity.
Proposition 4 In a news economy that satisﬁes [A1] and [A2], ﬁat money
coexists with capital for any 1 ≤ . The monetary equilibrium exhibits the
following properties: (i) 2()  2()=∗; (ii) 2  ∗; (iii) 2() strictly
decreasing in  and 2 strictly increasing in ;a n d( i v )0(2)  1.
Proof. Coexistence and properties (i)–(iii) follow from the discussion preced-
ing the proposition. To prove rate of return dominance, note that implies
 +(  − )()  . Thus, (41) implies 1  0(2).
The analysis to this point implies that in the monetary equilibrium: [a] there
is an over-accumulation of capital; [b] there is a Tobin eﬀect, in the sense that
higher inﬂation stimulates capital expenditure; [c] both money and capital are
equally liquid and used as a means of payment; and [d] capital dominates money
in expected rate of return.
In relation to the literature, we make the following observations. Lagos and
Rocheteau [6] demonstrate [a]-[c]; but achieve [d] by introducing a separate form
of capital that is assumed to be illiquid.4 Aruoba and Wright [2] demonstrate
[d]; but do so with an exogenous restriction that limits the use of capital as a
payment instrument. Moreover, in their model, the equilibrium capital stock is
independent of the inﬂation rate.5 In Stockman [9] and Aruoba, Wright, and
Waller [3], inﬂation acts as a tax on capital accumulation; and rate of return
dominance is achieved by imposing exogenous restrictions on the use of capital
as a means of payment.
In contrast, we make no restrictions on the type of assets that may be used
in making payments. Nevertheless, money in our environment not only coex-
4Lagos and Rocheteau [6] assume two storage technologies: one liquid, the other illiquid.
Liquid capital earns the same return as ﬁat money, while illiquid capital dominates money
in rate of return. Note that the money growth rate only aﬀects the accumulation of liquid
capital.
5The steady state capital stock is also invariant to inﬂation in Sidrauski [8]; and rate of
return dominance there is achieved by assuming that money enters the utility function.
14ists with a higher expected return asset, its existence is Pareto-improving (see
Proposition 6 below). Rate of return dominance is explained by news shocks
that make the value of capital (or capital backed assets) vary “too much” rela-
tive to what is desirable in a payment instrument. Money, in our model, oﬀers
a more stable rate return over the relevant (short-term) time horizon. To make
this more clear, consider the following argument.
Deﬁne () ≡ 2()1; that is, the ex post rate of return on money from
day to night. The following proposition establishes some results for the rates of
return on capital and money in our environment.
Proposition 5 In a news economy with money that satisﬁes [A1] and [A2]
with 1 ≤ , the monetary equilibrium exhibits the following properties:
(i) ()  ();( i i )()  (); (iii) ()  ();( i v )()=() if




();( v i )(()()) = 0
if 00()=0and (()())  0 otherwise.







Rewrite conditions (38) and (39) as
1= [()0()(()) + (1 − )()0()]
1=
£
−1(()) + (1 − )−1¤








latter equality requires ()0()  1
  ()0() Parts (i) and (ii) follow.







0(())].T h u s ,


















0(()).T h u s ,i f() is linear, ()=().
Otherwise, given ()  ∗, ()  ().
Part (v) follows from (i) and (ii).
For (vi),u s e(()()) = [()()] − [()][()].T h u s ,
(()()) =

2(1 − )0()[0(∗) − 0(())][()0(∗) − ()0(())]
0(())20(∗)2
15If () is linear then 0(∗) − 0(()) = 0 and the covariance is zero. Suppose
now 00()  0.S i n c e0(∗) − 0(())  0, the sign of the covariance is equal
to the sign of ()0(∗) − ()0(()). From (4) and [A1] we have 0(∗)=
0∗)∗
∗ , and from (43) we have 0(()) ≥
()0()
() .T h u s ,








Results (i)–(iv) in the proposition above establish the relationship between
the ex post rates of return on capital and money. As in the case with no ﬁat
money, ()  (). This just follows from capital being more valuable when
t h en e w si sg o o d .I nc o n t r a s t ,m o n e yf e a t u r e sah i g h e rex post return when the
news is bad, i.e., ()  ()–unless () is linear, in which case the returns
are equal. Fiat money is in higher demand when news is bad.
Result (v) shows that, for any parametrization consistent with a monetary
equilibrium, the ex post rate of return on capital is more “volatile” than the ex
post return on money. Consider the ratio
()()
()(),w h i c hi sam e a s u r eo ft h e
volatility of the ex post return on capital relative to money. After some simple
algebra, we get that this ratio is equal to
()
(). Thus, the relative volatility of
the ex post returns of the two assets depends only on the distance between ()
and (). Notably, it does not depend on the money growth rate.
Finally, result (vi) shows that when () is strictly convex, the covariance of
ex post returns on capital and money is negative. This result can be understood
in terms of the preceding discussion. When () is linear, the ex post returns
are uncorrelated, since the ex post return on money is constant.
5W e l f a r e
5.1 Inﬂation
Proposition 6 In a news economy with money that satisﬁes [A1] and [A2] with
1 ≤ ¯ : (i) ex ante welfare is strictly decreasing in ; and (ii) ex ante welfare
is higher than in the non-monetary economy.
Proof. Part (i) follows from Proposition 4, part (iii).F o rp a r t(ii),n o t et h a t
when  =¯ ,  =0and the equilibrium allocation coincides with the non-
monetary economy. Given part (i),f o r ∈ [1 ¯ ), welfare in the monetary
equilibrium is strictly higher than in the non-monetary economy.
The proposition above implies that the constrained-eﬃcient monetary pol-
icy here is to choose a zero (expected) inﬂation.6 Furthermore, whenever a
6Because preferences are quasilinear, stochastic variation in the rate of money growth has
no ex ante welfare consequences.
16monetary equilibrium with  ≥ 1 exists, the presence of ﬁat money improves
welfare.
5.2 Endogenous Capital Illiquidity
Aruoba and Wright [2] and Aruoba, Wright and Waller [3] assume that capital
is illiquid (it cannot be used to make payments at night). This sort of “cash-in-
advance” (CIA) constraint is frequently imposed in the literature for the purpose
of generating a demand for ﬁat money that is dominated in rate of return. As
pointed out in Lagos and Rocheteau [8], however, a CIA constraint of this form
is welfare-improving. Here, this result does not hold in general.
Suppose capital cannot be used as a means of payment at night. The mon-














Note that is this case, a monetary equilibrium exists for any ﬁnite , i.e., ¯  = ∞.
Lemma 7 In a news economy with illiquid capital and money with  ≥ 1,
()=()  ∗ and  = ∗.
Proof. Condition (45) implies  = ∗. From (46), we cannot have ()=
()=∗ for  . Suppose that for some , ()=∗. Then, for the other
state, (47) is held with strict inequality, i.e., the cash constraint is necessarily
slack and we get ∗ as well, a contradiction. Thus, ()  ∗ and ()  ∗.
Since (47) is held with equality in both states and 0() is strictly increasing
in ,w eg e t()=().
If capital cannot be used as a means of payment, then using (45)–(47) and
Lemma 7, the equilibrium allocation {3 3 3} is characterized by







3 = 3[0(3)+0(3)] (50)
Proposition 7 In a news economy that satisﬁes [A1] and [A2], restricting the
use of capital as a means of payment at night has an ambiguous welfare eﬀect.
Proof. From equations (41), (42), (48) and (49), we have 2  3 = ∗ and
2()  3  2()=∗. Thus, restricting capital as a means of payment
17eliminates the overaccumulation of capital (i.e., consumption during the day
increases), but has an ambiguous eﬀect on consumption at night.
We complete the proof with an example. Due to the linear preferences in
the day, we can look at average consumption in the day. Period expected utility
is
() −  +0 5[((()) − (()) + (1 − )((()) − (())]




+2(−) and 2 =[ ()+(1 − )(() − ())]
1
1−.
When both capital and money are used as means of payment, period ex-
pected utility is
[(1 − )(() − ()) + ()]

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− ln +l n ( 2  − )
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Assume ()= + , ()= −  and to satisfy [A1], set  = 1
 − (1 − 2).
For parameters, assume  =1 3,  =0 9,  =0 2 and  =2 .L e t∆() be the
diﬀerence in expected utility between the cases with only ﬁat money and with
money and capital as means of payment, as a function of the money growth
rate. For our parametrization, we get ∆(1) = 00108 and ∆(25) = −00111
(note ¯  =2 9634). In other words, for this example, restricting capital as a
means of payment is welfare improving for low money growth rates and welfare
reducing for high money growth rates. See Figure 1.
We now rely on numerical methods to provide a better idea of the welfare
eﬀects of restricting capital as a means of payment. Using the functional forms
from the example above, we conduct the following simulation. First, ﬁxt h e
value of . Second, take a random draw for {}. Third, create a grid for 
that takes values between 0 (i.e., no news) and 1
2(1−) (i.e., ()=0 ). We use
102 grid points and drop the ﬁrst and last elements of the grid. For each of these
parameterizations {} we verify if 0.I t i t i s , t h e n w e c a l c u l a t e
∆(), i.e., the diﬀerence in welfare between the cases with only money and with
money and capital as means of payment. For the ﬁxed , we repeat this sequence
until we get 10000000 parameterizations with 0 and calculate the fraction
of cases for which restricting capital as a means of payment is welfare improving
(i.e., for which ∆()  0).7 For  =1 , which is the constrained-eﬃcient policy,
restricting capital as means of payment improves welfare in 70% of admissible
7T h er e s u l t sa r en o ts i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent if we only simulate the model for 100000 para-
meterizations.
18parameterizations. Increasing  lowers this fraction: for  equal to 125, 15
and 2,t h en u m b e ri s52%, 36% and 15%, respectively.
Figure 1
Welfare gain from restricting the use of capital as a function of 
The result here is reminiscent of Kocherlakota [5], where restricting the
liquidity properties of bonds improves allocative eﬃciency. In the context of
our environment, the result appears related to the claim made in Proposition 2;
namely, that restricting the news ﬂow is welfare-improving. Capital constitutes
a poor medium of exchange as its value ﬂuctuates at high-frequency in response
to news, leaving some individuals debt-constrained when the news is bad. The
value of ﬁat money also varies in response to news; but this is because it must
compete with capital as a means of payment at night. This competition can
be eliminated by a restriction that prohibits the use of capital as a means of
payment. When this is so, the value of money is rendered “informationally
insensitive;” its expected return can be stabilized independent of the news ﬂow.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Our model highlights an inherent drawback in the use of private securities backed
by capital as a medium of exchange. The problem is that if these securities
19circulate, their values will ﬂuctuate at high-frequency–like any other traded
security–in response to news. While this is not necessarily a bad property
for any asset to possess, it hinders the value of any such asset as a medium of
exchange. This observation may rationalize the widespread use of debt (rather
than equity) as a payment instrument. To the extent that the government sector
now has an advantage in creating debt that is insensitive to news, our analysis
suggests a rationale for the recent emergence of ﬁat money systems.
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